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ABSTRACT 
Consumers constantly make product decisions involving temporal and monetary 
considerations. In this work, we examine how consideration of these two fundamental economic 
resources influences the stability of product evaluations. Results from a series of seven 
experiments demonstrate that, despite prior research that has shown that the valuation of time is 
more ambiguous and context-dependent than the valuation of money, time-based product 
preferences tend to be more consistent than money-based product preferences. Our findings 
support an affect-based account: compared to monetary considerations, temporal considerations 
elicit greater reliance on feelings versus analytical evaluation, which facilitates holistic 
judgments and promotes preference consistency. Consequently, reliance on feeling (vs. thinking) 
when evaluating products based on monetary considerations can generate greater preference 
stability. Our experimental results also rule out alternative accounts based on differential 
decisional difficulty and attribute importance, as well as suggest new questions for future 
research. (142 words) 
 
Keywords: Time versus Money, Preference Consistency, Affective Processing, Choice, 
Decision-Making. 
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Decisions involving considerations of time and of money are ubiquitous in everyday life. 
While the latter has been the subject of voluminous research, the former has only of late been in 
the spotlight. Emerging research in the study of these two fundamental economic resources has 
illuminated a number of differences in how they are treated psychologically. For instance, 
consumers have a more flexible and context-dependent valuation of time compared to money 
(Okada and Hoch 2004), are more risk-averse when dealing with probabilistic outcomes of time 
than of money (Leclerc, Schmitt and Dube 1995), are less susceptible to the sunk-cost fallacy 
when the cost involved is an investment of time rather than money (Soman 2001), tend to 
discount time more than money (Zauberman and Lynch 2005), and experience a stronger sense 
of personal connection from using a product when prompted to think about time instead of 
money (Mogilner and Aaker 2009).  
The current work contributes to this growing literature by asking the question of whether 
product-choice decisions that involve a consideration of time exhibit more or less stability 
compared to a consideration of money. In other words, are preferences as revealed over multiple 
choice occasions more consistent when they involve time or money? If a difference in preference 
consistency exists, what is the mechanism that underlies this difference? Is the difference due to 
people adopting qualitatively different mindsets when they process time versus money? An 
understanding of this difference and its underlying process can provide further insights into the 
fundamental differences between these two important economic resources and their downstream 
behavioral consequences. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We first review recent research that 
examines differences in how people think about time and money; by building on these previous 
findings, we construct two hypotheses for whether choices involving time or money would 
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exhibit greater preference consistency. We then test these hypotheses in a series of seven 
experiments.  
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF TIME VERSUS MONEY 
 Research that contrasts the psychological correlates of processing time and money may 
be usefully characterized as falling into two main themes. The first revolves around how 
accounting for time differs from accounting for money and the impact of this difference on 
decision-making. The second examines the constructs that are activated when people process 
time information versus monetary information and the downstream consequences that difference 
might have. 
 Prior research on the first theme suggests that people have a poorer grasp of the value of 
time than the value of money. Zauberman and Lynch (2005), for instance, show that people tend 
to perceive greater slack in how much time they have as a resource in the future compared to 
money. Consequently, people tend to more steeply discount future expenditures of time than of 
money and erroneously perceive being much busier in the present than they will be in the future. 
Okada and Hoch (2004) further show that people value time with less precision. For instance, 
people’s expressed monetary equivalent of their time was found to be malleable – participants 
reported a significantly higher value when an expenditure of their time led to a positive 
compared to a negative consumption experience. Saini and Monga (2008), arguing that this 
greater ambiguity in the value of time makes the task of processing temporal information (vs. 
monetary information) more difficult, found a greater reliance on heuristics when people make 
decisions about time as they attempt to simplify the decision process.  
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 Explanations for these time-money differences have focused on the property of 
fungibility. Time, compared to money, is less fungible; that is, a savings in time cannot be stored 
for later use nor can a shortfall of time be easily recouped by borrowing against future periods. In 
contrast, units of money are substitutable or exchangeable across different contexts, allowing its 
value to be immutable regardless of transaction. This difference, coupled with the fact that 
people are more accustomed to using money than time as a medium of exchange, allows them to 
have a better grasp on the value of money than the value of time (Ebert and Prelec 2007; Leclerc, 
Schmitt and Dube 1995; Okada and Hoch 2004; Soman 2001; Soster, Monga, and Bearden 2010; 
Zauberman and Lynch 2005). 
 The second theme looks at what constructs are activated when people process time (vs. 
money) information and how those constructs then guide subsequent processing. Liu and Aaker 
(2008) showed that prompting people to think about spending time on a charitable cause prior to 
asking for a monetary donation leads to a greater willingness to donate. They argue that thinking 
about time activates an emotional mindset that precipitates thoughts about personal happiness. 
These thoughts underlie people’s subsequent willingness to make a charitable gift. Thinking 
about money, on the other hand, is more likely to activate a value-maximizing mindset that is 
less affect-laden and less likely to engender a desire to donate. Similarly, Mogilner and Aaker 
(2009) showed that directing people’s attention to time (vs. money) spent on a product heightens 
their sense of personal connection to a product, pointing once again to a potential link between 
time and an affective mindset. They found that this result holds regardless of whether that time 
spent was positively or negatively valenced (e.g., time spent listening to music on an iPod versus 
time spent fixing a laptop). Further evidence that an affective response accompanies the 
processing of time rather than money comes from Mogilner (2010), where a series of studies 
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revealed that priming participants to think about time versus money led to higher levels of 
intended and actual participation in social activities and also to higher levels of reported 
happiness. Taken together, these findings suggest that considerations of time and money can lead 
to different degrees of affective processing and influence how people form their preferences.  
 
PREFERENCE CONSISTENCY FOR CHOICES INVOLVING TIME OR MONEY 
 Given these various differences between time and money as resources that the extant 
literature has uncovered, we examine their implications and consider whether people’s 
preferences are more consistent when these preferences are based more on time or when they are 
based more on money. That is, do people exhibit more stable preferences in product choices that 
involve considerations of time (e.g., choosing between flights that have different flight/transit 
duration) or choices that involve considerations of money (e.g., choosing between flights that 
have different prices)? It became apparent from examining the literature that it was not merely 
silent on this issue but was rather equivocal.  
Evidence suggesting that the consideration of money in one’s decisions will lead to more 
consistent preferences is provided by studies that have demonstrated greater ambiguity in the 
valuation of time compared to money (as discussed in the previous section). People appear to 
have greater difficulty valuing time, such that the worth they assign to it can be variable and 
susceptible to effects of context. A consequence of this greater variability in the value of time, in 
contrast to the value of money, ought to be less stable preferences for choices that involve time. 
The greater ambiguity of time (vs. money) valuation could also lead people to resort to 
simplifying the decision process when making choices that involve time (vs. money). Saini and 
Monga (2008), for instance, found that participants faced with a decision involving time (vs. 
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money) were more susceptible to anchoring and more likely to choose the compromise option in 
a choice set. These heuristics lead to choices that are more context-dependent, suggesting that 
preferences might be more inconsistent when temporal (vs. monetary) considerations are 
involved. Similarly, both Tversky (1969) and Gigerenzer (2000) provide examples where the use 
of non-compensatory strategies could result in preference instability. 
On the other hand, if the value of time is deemed too ambiguous to be useful in the 
decision, one might ignore it altogether (c.f. Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993; Redelmeier and 
Kahneman 1996). In this case, greater preference consistency in decisions can in fact be expected 
to result.  
Additional evidence supporting the prediction of greater preference consistency in the 
case of time (vs. money) comes from merging two streams of research. The first, discussed in the 
previous section, has shown that prompting people to think about time leads them to activate 
constructs that have an affective basis (e.g., personal happiness, personal connection to a 
product). The second is research that has shown that reliance on affect in decision making leads 
to more consistent preferences (Lee, Amir and Ariely 2009). This research appeals to a 
distinction between two modes of processing – the cognitive mode is described as being more 
rational, analytical, and deliberative, whereas the affective mode is more holistic and relies more 
on experiential and emotional input (Damasio 1994; Epstein 1994, 2003; Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue 2004). The greater care that is presumed to accompany analytical and deliberative 
processing might suggest greater consistency in preferences with this mode of processing. 
However, analytical processing also tends to be more piecemeal and to entail inconsistent 
weighting of information (Nordgren and Dijksterhuis 2009), generating ‘cognitive noise’ that can 
adversely affect preference stability (Lee, Amir and Ariely 2009). Affective processing, on the 
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other hand, is associated with more holistic assessments (Epstein and Pacini 1999); the focus on 
the ‘gist’ of a target stimulus ensures that a more consistent manner of assessment is brought to 
bear. Lee, Amir and Ariely (2009) found that when a stimulus evoked greater affect, such as 
when it was presented pictorially or in color, a greater consistency in preferences was observed. 
Inducing greater trust in one’s feelings when making a decision similarly led to greater 
preference consistency. A related finding is one by Pham et al. (2001), where greater consistency 
in assessment was found across participants when they made feeling-based rather than reason-
based judgments.  
In sum, preferences based on the consideration of time rather than money might be 
expected to be less consistent given the inherent ambiguity in the value of time. On the other 
hand, such preferences might be expected to be more consistent if one copes with this ambiguity 
by resorting to decision simplification through omitting consideration of the temporal factor 
altogether. Greater consistency might also be expected if the processing of time information is 
more affective rather than analytical, given that preferences formed on the basis of affect has 
been shown to result in greater consistency. These various alternative processes motivated the 
main objectives of the current research, which are: (1) to ascertain whether preferences are more 
consistent with time or with money; and (2) to elucidate the mechanism that underlies any 
difference in consistency by explicitly testing the above alternative accounts. 
 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
The experimental paradigm used across all of the experiments reported here is adapted 
from Lee, Amir and Ariely (2009). It employs a two-stage procedure and uses transitivity as a 
measure of preference consistency. In the first stage (product-study), participants were given as 
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much time as they needed to examine a set of nine sequentially presented product options, with 
each option described by a number of product attributes, including a money-related and/or a 
time-related attribute. In the second stage (product-choice), participants were shown all pair-wise 
combinations of these options presented in a random order and asked to choose the option they 
preferred in each pair. (Participants were told at the beginning of the experiment before studying 
any of the options that they would have to make these choices in the second stage.) Each 
participant thus completed a total of 36 product choices. 
To measure the degree of consistency in each participant’s set of choices, we computed 
the number of instances of transitivity violation such that, for a subset of three options (A, B, and 
C), the participant chose option A over option B, option B over option C, but option C over 
option A (Kendall and Babington Smith 1940; Lee, Amir, and Ariely 2009). A larger number of 
such intransitivity cycles indicates greater inconsistency in the underlying preferences for the set 
of options.  
  In Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, we find that choices involving time show greater 
preference consistency. The robustness of this finding is demonstrated across three different 
product categories, three different approaches to manipulating the focal resource (time or 
money), and two alternative measures of consistency (the transitivity measure mentioned above 
and an alternative measure involving the rank-order correlation between choices and ratings). 
After establishing the basic effect, we then conducted experiments to examine the mechanism 
that drives this effect. In experiments 3 and 4, we find convergent evidence that implicates the 
more affectively-laden processing of time (vs. money) as the driver of our effect; the greater 
reliance on feeling rather than thinking facilitates a more holistic rather than analytic approach to 
target evaluation, thereby leading to greater consistency in preferences. Finally, in experiments 5 
  
10
and 6, we examine how situationally induced (experimentally manipulated) and dispositional 
(measured) reliance on feelings moderates the basic effect, providing further evidence for the 
role of affect in preference consistency. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1A: TESTING THE BASIC EFFECT – PREFERENCE STABILITY IN 
CHOOSING INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS 
Overview and Method 
 Experiment 1 was designed to test whether people exhibit greater preference consistency 
when making product choices that involve a commitment of time or of money.  
 In this experiment, 166 students from a large northeastern university in the U.S. were 
asked to imagine that they were planning a trip to Asia that required them to buy an international 
round-trip ticket. Using the general experimental paradigm described in the overview, we 
instructed participants to examine a set of nine different flight options and then choose their 
preferred flight in each of 36 pairs of options. The degree of preference inconsistency for each 
participant was determined by computing the number of transitivity violations that the participant 
committed in his or her choices. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions—control, time, and 
money. In all three conditions, each flight option was represented by a service rating (1-5 stars) 
and an in-flight entertainment rating (1-5 stars); however, in addition to these two attributes, 
participants in the time condition were also given the average one-way flight duration of each 
flight option, while participants in the money condition were also given the airfare of each flight 
option. The one-way flight duration of the nine options ranged from 19 hr 10 min. (1,150 min.) 
to 25 hr 53 min. (1,553 min.), while the airfares ranged from $1,150 to $1,553.  
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 Additionally, to ascertain whether any differences in preference consistency could be 
attributed to differing degrees of evaluative difficulty in the three conditions, after participants 
had made their choices, we asked them to rate on a seven-point scale (1: very easy – 7: very 
difficult) how easy/difficult they perceived the choice task to be. In addition, we also captured an 
objective (albeit more indirect) measure of decision difficulty—the amount of time each 
participant took to complete the choice task. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preference consistency. A comparison of the number of intransitivity cycles using 
ANOVA revealed different degrees of transitivity violations across the three conditions (F(2, 
163) = 5.31, p = .006) (see figure 1). Post-hoc comparisons using Fisher’s Least Square 
Difference (LSD) Test further showed that participants in the money condition made 
significantly more intransitivity errors (M  = 4.34, SD = 4.05) than both participants in the time 
condition (M  = 2.85, SD = 3.54; Mean diff. = 1.48, Critical diff. = 1.31, p = .03) and the control 
condition  (M  = 2.18, SD = 2.76; Mean diff. = -2.15, Critical diff. = 1.33, p = .002); participants 
in the time condition and the control condition, however, did not differ statistically in the number 
of transitivity violations they made (Mean diff. = -.67, Critical diff. = 1.29, p = .31). 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert figures 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Decision time and perceived decision difficulty. Participants in both the money condition 
(M  = 158.09 sec., SD = 79.26 sec.) and the time condition (M  = 154.55 sec., SD = 69.91 sec.) 
took significantly more time to make their choices compared to those in the control condition (M 
= 99.95 sec., SD = 48.63 sec.; both p < .0001; overall ANOVA, F(1, 163) = 13.03, p < .0001) 
(see figure 2). Additionally, participants in both the money condition (M  = 3.35, SD = 1.45) and 
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the time condition (M  = 3.27 s, SD = 1.64) also rated the choice task to be marginally more 
difficult than those in the control condition (Mcontrol = 2.76, SD = 1.56; p = .06 for money, p = .08 
for time; overall ANOVA: F(1, 163) = 2.27 p = .11). These differences are not surprising given 
that participants in the control condition had fewer attributes to assess. Importantly, however, 
despite making different numbers of intransitivity errors on average, participants in the money 
condition and the time condition did not differ in how long they took to make their choices 
(Mean diff. = 3.44 sec., Critical diff. = 25.16 sec., p = .79), or how easy/difficult they perceived 
the choice task to be (Mean diff. = .08, Critical diff. = .59, p = .80). 
 Hence, the results of experiment 1 provide initial evidence that product choices are less 
consistent when price is involved in the evaluation of product attributes than when time is 
involved. Moreover, both the objective decision time measures and the subjective choice 
difficulty ratings indicate that the observed differences in preference consistency across the three 
conditions cannot be accounted for by any actual or perceived differences in the difficulty of the 
choice task. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1B: TESTING THE BASIC EFFECT – PREFERENCE STABILITY IN 
CHOOSING SOFTWARE PACKAGES 
Overview and Method 
 Our goal in experiment 1B was to conceptually replicate the differential preference 
consistency between time- and money-based product choice found in experiment 1A using a 
different approach to manipulate participants’ consideration of time versus money in their 
choices. Specifically, unlike experiment 1A, in this experiment, participants across all conditions 
were shown all four attributes, where only the values of these attributes differed depending on 
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the condition participants were assigned to. The intent of this approach was to present 
participants with the same set of attributes across conditions, but at the same time, induce 
participants to place less weight on the attribute that did not help to differentiate between 
options. Additionally, in this experiment, we also used a different set of choice stimuli and added 
questions to measure participants’ perception of the task. 
A total of 78 English-speaking students from a large university in Asia were asked to 
imagine that they had to work on an important project—creating a photo essay—and had to 
purchase a photo-essay software package for that purpose. They were first shown a set of nine 
different software options represented by four different attributes (software features [1 – 5 stars], 
software quality [1 – 5 stars], set-up time, and price) and asked to examine the various options, 
one at a time. They were then presented with pairs of software options and had to choose their 
preferred option in each pair.  
 As in experiment 1A, this experiment included three conditions – participants were 
randomly assigned to the control condition, the money condition, or the time condition. In the 
control condition, only features rating and quality rating differed across software options while 
set-up time and price were held constant; in the money condition, set-up time was held constant 
while the other attributes varied across options; and finally, in the time condition, price was held 
constant while the other attributes varied.  
In this experiment, we also wanted to control for the nominal magnitudes of software 
price and set-up time. To this end, we used the same nominal values for both set-up time and 
price – the prices of the nine software options ranged from $5 to $45 at increasing intervals of 
$5, while the set-up time ranged from 5 minutes to 45 minutes at increasing intervals of 5 
minutes.  
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As in experiment 1A, after making their product choices, participants were asked to rate 
how difficult they perceived the choice task to be (1: very easy – 7: very difficult). Additionally, 
we also asked them to rate how similar or different they thought the given software options were 
from one another (1: very similar – 7: very different), as well as how informative they found the 
attribute information to be (1: not at all informative – 7: very informative). These measures were 
included to allow us to examine if perceived variability in software options and perceived 
informativeness of attribute information might serve as alternative accounts for any preference 
consistency differences across conditions.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Preference consistency. Consistent with the basic result pattern found in experiment 1A, 
participants in the money condition (M = 5.96, SD = 5.97) committed significantly more 
transitivity violations than participants in the control condition (M = 2.92, SD = 3.46; p = .02) as 
well as those in the time condition (M = 3.59, SD = 3.14; p = .05); overall ANOVA: F(2, 75) = 
3.44, p = .04. As before, participants in the time condition and the control condition did not 
differ in the number of transitivity violations they committed (p = .58). 
 Decision time and perceived decision difficulty. Again, mirroring the results in 
experiment 1A, there was an overall significant difference in the amount of time participants 
took to make their choices across conditions (F(2, 75) = 5.64, p = .005). Specifically, decision 
times were significantly longer in the money condition (M = 171.28 sec., SD = 62.58 sec.) and 
the time condition (M = 173.94 sec., SD = 71.60 sec.) compared to the control condition (M = 
122.35, SD = 51.06 sec.; both p < .01). In contrast, participants in the money and time conditions 
did not differ in how long they took to decide (p = .88). Unlike the results of experiment 1A, 
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participants across the three conditions did not differ statistically in their perceived difficulty of 
the choice task (F(2, 75) = .21, p = .81).  
 Perceived option variability and attribute informativeness. There was no significant 
difference in the perceived informativeness of attribute information across conditions (Mcontrol  = 
3.92, SD = 1.70; Mmoney  = 3.44, SD = 1.53; Mtime  = 4.11, SD = 1.55; F(2, 75) = 1.21, p = .30), 
nor was there a significant difference in how similar or different they thought the nine software 
options were (Mcontrol  = 4.50, SD = 1.48; Mmoney  = 4.08, SD = 1.29; Mtime  = 4.30, SD = 1.14; 
F(2, 75) = .66, p = .52). 
 In sum, this experiment replicated the findings in experiment 1A using a different product 
category and a different approach to manipulate the focus on time versus money during product 
choice, demonstrating again that preferences formed on the basis of monetary considerations are 
more inconsistent than those formed on the basis of temporal considerations. The results of the 
various additional measures further indicate that this transitivity result pattern cannot be 
sufficiently explained by any differences in perceived or experienced difficulty of the decision 
task, as well as by any differences in perceived variability or attribute informativeness of the 
software options across conditions. 
 While we have aimed to rule out differences in decision difficulty as a potential 
alternative explanation using the additional measures of decision time, perceived choice 
difficulty, perceived option variability, and attribute informativeness, it still remains possible that 
the greater ambiguity inherent in the value of time led participants in the time condition to 
simplify the decision process by reducing the importance of the time attribute or disregarding the 
time attribute altogether, thereby leading to more consistent preferences. Alternatively, 
participants may have just cared less when the choice options involved money than when they 
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involved time (although not likely given the participant population of college students), leading 
them to take the task less seriously and, consequently, to make more random errors. Although the 
lack of significant differences in both decision time and subjective choice difficulty in 
experiments 1A and 1B cast doubt on these accounts, in the following experiment, we address 
these concerns more fully by examining the decision weights that participants placed on the time 
and money attributes relative to other attributes.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2: DECISION WEIGHTS AND AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF 
PREFERNCE CONSISTENCY 
Overview and Method 
We designed experiment 2 with three objectives in mind. First, we wanted to examine the 
validity of the differential-decision-weights account, as discussed in the previous section. In 
other words, we wanted to test whether the observed differences in preference consistency across 
conditions—particularly between the time and money conditions—may have been due to 
participants in one condition weighing the focal resource (time or money) significantly more 
than participants in the other condition. We accomplished this using two approaches: (1) by 
directly having participants rate (after the choice task) how important each attribute was to their 
choice decisions; and (2) by indirectly imputing participants’ decision weights on the focal 
attributes based on their choices and comparing these weights across conditions.  
 Second, to lend greater confidence to our choice of transitivity as a measure of preference 
consistency (despite the presence of prior work [Lee, Amir, and Ariely 2009] that has used the 
same measure), we attempted to replicate the basic effect using an additional dependent measure. 
Specifically, we had participants rate the nine product options based on how much they liked 
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them and then computed the rank-order correlation between the ratings-imputed ranks and 
choice-imputed ranks. We then compared this rank-order correlation across conditions. 
 Third, we wanted to further test the robustness of our basic effect by using a different set 
of product stimuli. One might argue that the flights and software stimuli that we have used so far 
are rather impoverished; therefore, we used richer product descriptions for options from yet 
another product category—vacation resorts. Along with several numerical attributes as in the 
previous experiments, each vacation resort was also represented by a name, a color picture, as 
well as a short qualitative description. 
A total of 139 respondents from an online survey company participated in this 
experiment for a small payment. Three respondents indicated in a post-experiment questionnaire 
that they had participated in a similar study before and one respondent took an unusually long 
time to complete the choice task (more than three standard deviations above the mean). These 
respondents were hence excluded from the analysis, giving us an effective sample size of 135.1 
Using the same two-stage binary-choice paradigm adopted in the earlier experiments, 
participants were first asked to imagine that they were planning a vacation at the end of the 
upcoming summer and to carefully study nine different vacation resorts. Each resort option was 
represented by four attributes (food rating [1-5], activities rating [1-5], price, duration of stay), as 
well as a resort name, a color picture, and a short description of the resort. We used the same 
approach as in experiment 1B to manipulate relative focus on the temporal attribute versus the 
monetary attribute. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: in the time 
condition, price was held constant at the average amount of $2,400 but duration (3 – 11 days) 
varied across resort options; in the money condition, duration was held constant at the average 
                                                 
1 The main pattern of results remained statistically significant at the p = .05 level when these participants were 
included. 
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duration of 7 days but price ($1,094 – $3,890) varied across resort options instead; in the control 
condition, both price and duration were held constant across options. 
Next, participants were presented with all possible pairs of options and asked to choose 
their preferred option in each pair. After making their choices, in addition to rating perceived 
choice-task difficulty and product-options variability as before, participants were asked to rate on 
separate 7-point scales (1: not at all important – 7: very important) how important each of the 
attributes (food, activities, price, and duration) was to them when they made their choices. 
Finally, participants were shown the nine options again and asked to rate how much they liked 
each option on a 0-100 sliding scale (with larger numbers corresponding to greater liking).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Preference consistency. The basic effect was again replicated – participants in the money 
condition (M = 4.32, SD = 6.07) committed significantly more transitivity violations than 
participants in the control condition (M = 2.57, SD = 2.89; p = .04) as well as those in the time 
condition (M = 2.07, SD = 2.60; p = .01; overall ANOVA: F(2, 132) = 3.55, p = .03). In contrast, 
participants in the time condition and the control condition did not differ in the number of 
transitivity violations they committed (p = .57). 
 Rank-order correlation. Participants’ preference orders for the nine options were imputed 
in two ways: first based on their choices and then based on their post-choice ratings for how 
much they liked each option. The rank-order correlation for the preference orders from these two 
methods was then computed and compared across conditions. As expected, this analysis revealed 
a pattern of results that reverse-mirrored the transitivity results. Specifically, there was an overall 
significant difference in rank-order correlations across the three conditions (F(2, 132) = 4.19, p = 
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.02). Post-hoc comparisons using Fisher’s Test further revealed that participants in the money 
condition had significantly lower rank-order correlations (M = .64, SD = .36) than both 
participants in the time condition (M = .79, SD = .21; p < .01) and those in the control condition 
(M = .75, SD = .20; p = .03). There was, however, no significant difference in rank-order 
correlations between the time and control conditions (p = .48). Importantly, supporting our 
alternative measure of preference consistency, there was a significant negative correlation 
between the number of intransitivity errors that participants made in the choice task and their 
rank-order correlations (r = -.65, p < .001) – the more consistent participants were in their 
imputed rankings (choice-based and ratings-based), the more transitive their choices were.  
 Decision time, perceived decision difficulty, and option variability. There was an overall 
marginally significant difference in decision time across conditions (F(2, 132) = 2.34, p = .10), 
with participants in both the money condition (M = 195.28 sec., SD = 98.02 sec.) and the time 
condition (M = 194.47 sec., SD = 63.23 sec.) taking more time to make their choices compared to 
participants in the control condition (M = 164.42, SD = 70.99 sec.; both p < .08). However, 
participants in the money condition and the time condition did not differ in the amount of time 
they took to decide (p = .96). Moreover, as in experiment 1B, participants across the three 
conditions did not differ statistically in their perceived difficulty of the choice task (F(2, 132) = 
.36, p = .70) nor did they differ in how similar they perceived the different options to be (F(2, 
132) = .61, p = .54). Again, these results indicate that neither objective nor subjective decision 
difficulty can fully account for the main preference consistency results. 
Self-reported decision weights. As expected, and validating the resource type 
manipulation, participants in the time condition and money condition indeed placed more weight 
on duration and price, respectively, when making their choices (see figure 3). There was an 
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overall significant difference in self-reported decision weights on price across conditions (F(2, 
132) = 8.95, p < .001), with participants in the money condition placing more weight on price in 
their decisions (M = 5.46, SD = 1.75) than participants in both the time (M = 4.41, SD = 1.94; p 
= .01) and control conditions (M = 3.78, SD = 2.05; p < .001). Likewise, there was an overall 
significant difference in self-reported decision weights on duration across conditions (F(2, 132) 
= 22.80, p < .001), with participants in the time condition placing more weight on duration in 
their decisions (M = 5.95, SD = 1.27) than participants in both the money (M = 4.34, SD = 1.66; 
p < .001) and the control conditions (M = 3.53, SD = 2.08; p < .001). However, there was no 
significant difference in the importance weights participants placed on either food (F(2, 132) = 
1.48, p = .23) or activities (F(2, 132) = 1.51, p = .22) across conditions. Importantly, there was 
no significant difference in the importance weight placed on the focal attribute, that is, between 
the importance weight placed on duration for participants in the time condition and the 
importance weight placed on price for participants in the money condition (t(84) = 1.51, p = .14), 
indicating that participants in the time and money conditions weighed their respective focal-
resource attribute similarly.2 We also note that the main transitivity results remained significant 
after controlling for the variance in each participants’ decision weights across attributes (F(2, 
131) = 3.26, p = .04). Examining the distribution of decision weights across conditions, the 
variance of participants’ decisions weights also did not differ significantly across conditions 
(F(2, 132) = 1.88, p = .16).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
                                                 
2 Analyzing participants’ standardized weights revealed the same pattern of results: there was no significant 
difference in the standardized importance weight placed on the focal attribute, that is, between the standardized 
importance weight placed on duration for participants in the time condition (M = .33, SD = .64) and the standardized 
importance weight placed on price for participants in the money condition (M = .36, SD = .64; t(84) = .15, p = .88).    
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Choice-imputed decision weights. For further evidence that our main finding cannot 
simply be accounted for by a difference in decision weights placed on the focal attribute between 
participants in the time condition and those in the money condition, we analyzed participants’ 
imputed decision weights on the various attributes based on their actual choices. For this 
analysis, we performed the following steps:  
(a) First, we ran separate binary-choice models using logistic regressions for each 
participant to compute the weights that the participant placed on the various attributes. 
Specifically we regressed participants’ choice of the left option (binary DV) on the standardized 
differences in the attribute value of food as well as the focal attribute (duration in the time 
condition, price in the money condition). We omitted the activities attribute from the regression 
since, by design, the values of this attribute were almost perfectly negatively correlated with the 
values of the food attribute (r = -.98, p < .001) – this design feature provides inherent trade-offs 
in attributes across options. 
(b) Next, we compared using a t-test the imputed relative standardized weights on the 
focal attribute between the time condition and the money condition. Relative standardized 
weights on the focal attribute were computed by dividing the standardized coefficient for 
duration/price by the standardized coefficient for food from the per-participant logistic 
regressions (Train 2009). Since participants almost always preferred longer and cheaper 
vacations, we reversed the signs of the coefficients for price for participants in the money 
condition to allow for comparability. Additionally, analyzing the choices that participants made, 
we noted that six participants in the money condition and eight participants in the time condition 
adopted a lexicographic rule when choosing between options: always choosing the longer or the 
cheaper vacation. These participants were removed from the analysis since their imputed relative 
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weights on the focal attribute were undefined.3 Results of the t-test revealed that participants in 
the time and money conditions did not differ significantly in their imputed relative weights on the 
focal attribute (t(72) = -1.20, p = .23). Further, the main preference consistency result—that 
participants in the money condition committed more transitivity violations than those in the time 
condition—remained significant after controlling for the imputed relative standardized weight 
(focal attribute / food) on the focal attribute (t(71) = 2.21, p =. 03). 
Taken together, the results of this experiment provide further support for the robustness 
of the main preference consistency effect by: (1) replicating the effect using an alternative 
measure of preference consistency; (2) demonstrating that it generalizes to more enriched 
product stimuli with pictorial and verbal descriptive information; and (3) ruling out an alternative 
account that suggests that the decision weights placed on the focal attribute may have been 
different between the time and money conditions, through analyzing participants’ self-reported 
decision weights as well as their imputed weights derived from the actual choices that they made. 
We also did not find evidence for greater use of heuristic processing with considerations of time 
than of money in the choice task (c.f. Saini and Monga 2008). 
While our first set of experiments demonstrated the robustness of the effect and tested for 
various stimulus and information-processing related explanations, we have not provided 
evidence for the psychological process that produces this effect. In the remaining experiments, 
we turn our attention to understanding the mechanism responsible for the difference in 
preference consistency when choices involve a consideration of time and when they involve a 
consideration of money. Building on prior work that has examined how the processing of time 
information and monetary information are qualitatively different (Liu and Aaker 2008; Mogilner 
                                                 
3 One participant in the money condition and two participants in the time condition always chose the vacation option 
with the higher food rating in each pair, adopting a different type of lexicographic decision rule. Removing these 
three participants from the analysis did not change any of the result patterns. 
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and Aaker 2009) as well as work that has examined the antecedents of preference consistency 
(Lee, Amir, and Ariely 2009), we posit that people are more likely to process product choices 
that involve time more affectively compared to product choices that involve money, thus 
exhibiting greater preference consistency with time- than money-based evaluations.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3: PROCESSING MODES AND EFFECT MEDIATION 
Overview and Method 
 In this experiment, we tested the hypothesis that when people process product 
information involving a consideration of time (vs. money), there is greater reliance on feeling 
rather than thinking in their product decisions. Conversely, there is greater reliance on thinking 
when monetary (vs. temporal) considerations are involved. We also tested the hypothesis that it 
is this difference that underlies the greater preference consistency when product choices have a 
temporal (vs. monetary) attribute. In addition, to further test the robustness of the preference 
consistency finding established in the earlier experiments, we employed a different manipulation 
for time versus money resource consideration. Rather than inducing differential attention to a 
time (money) attribute by holding the values on the competing money (time) attribute constant 
across options, in this experiment, we used a priming approach to induce a greater focus on time 
or money. This approach has the advantage of keeping the choice set identical across conditions.   
 A total of 198 participants at a large Asian university were recruited for this experiment 
in exchange for course credit. Three participants took an unusually short time to complete the 
experiment (more than three standard deviations below the mean) and three participants showed 
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no variation in their responses to the post-choice survey. These participants were excluded from 
the analysis, giving us an effective sample size of 192.4  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: time or money. They first 
completed a survey on ‘Recreational Activities’: in the time (money) condition, participants were 
asked to indicate the type of recreational activities they typically engaged in, the average amount 
of time (money) per week they spent on these activities, the average amount of time (money) per 
week they thought the typical individual spent on these activities, and any thoughts they might 
have pertaining to the time (money) they spent on these activities. The intent of this survey was 
to prime the relative salience of temporal versus monetary considerations, with the expectation 
that this greater salience would then carry over to the subsequent choice task. 
 Next, in a purportedly unrelated study, participants completed the two-stage binary 
choice task as in the earlier experiments. We used the same flights stimuli as in experiment 1A, 
except that participants were shown all four attributes of the flight options (service rating [1-5], 
in-flight entertainment rating [1-5], 1-way flight duration, and airfare) with identical product 
information across all conditions. 
Finally, participants completed a short post-choice survey in which they rated their 
perceived difficulty of the choice task, perceived variability of the flight options, and perceived 
informativeness of the given attribute information, as in the earlier experiments. Importantly, 
they were also asked to indicate how much they had relied on their feelings versus logical 
considerations when making their choices (1: feelings only – 7: logical considerations only). At 
the very end of the study, as a final exploratory question to see if participants could intuit how 
(in)consistent their choices were, we briefly explained the concept of transitivity as a measure of 
                                                 
4 The main pattern of results remained significant at the p = .05 level after including the three participants who 
showed no variation in their responses. However, the main preference consistency finding became non-significant 
after including the three participants who took an unusually short time to complete the experiment (p = .13).  
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preference consistency and then asked them to rate how transitive they thought their choices 
were (1: not at all transitive – 7: very transitive). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Preference consistency and decision process. Consistent with the results in the earlier 
experiments, participants in the money condition (M = 8.97, SD = 7.28) committed significantly 
more transitivity violations than those in the time condition (M = 6.90, SD = 6.26; t(190) = 2.06, 
p = .04). Participants in the money condition (M = 5.09, SD = 1.36) also reported relying 
relatively less on feelings than on logical considerations while making their decisions compared 
to participants in the time condition (M = 4.64, SD = 1.33; t(190) = 2.34, p = .02). More 
importantly, this differential reliance on logical considerations versus feelings fully mediated the 
effect of priming money versus time on preference consistency. Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) 
SPSS macro with 5,000 bootstrapped samples revealed indirect-only mediation (Zhao, Lynch, 
and Chen 2010): controlling for resource priming, reliance on logical considerations over 
feelings was positively associated with number of transitivity violations (B = .76, t(189) = 2.09, p 
= .04); controlling for reliance on logical considerations over feelings, the direct effect of 
resource priming (time = 0; money = 1) on the number of transitivity violations was not 
significant (B = 1.72, t(189) = 1.74, p = .08); the indirect path (B = .35) had a 95% confidence 
interval that did not include 0 (.04, .93). 
Decision time and perceived decision difficulty. There was no significant difference in 
either the total amount of time taken for participants to make their choices (Mmoney = 216.77 sec., 
SD = 111.24 sec. vs. Mtime = 200.94 sec., SD = 112.06 sec.; t(189) = .98, p = .32), or the 
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perceived difficulty of the choice task (Mmoney = 3.84, SD = 1.56 vs. Mtime = 4.16 sec., SD = 1.51; 
t(190) = 1.46, p = .15) across conditions. 
Perceived option variability and attribute informativeness. Similarly, no significant 
difference was found on the measures of perceived variability of flight options (Mmoney = 4.04, 
SD = 1.39 vs. Mtime = 4.20, SD = 1.40; t(190) = .80, p = .42) and perceived informativeness of 
attribute information (Mmoney = 4.85, SD = 1.54 vs. Mtime = 4.59, SD = 1.49; t(190) = 1.20, p = 
.23). 
Perceived transitivity of choices. Interestingly, participants’ perceptions of the transitivity 
of their choices did not differ between the two conditions (Mmoney = 4.11 SD = 1.32 vs. Mtime = 
4.12, SD = 1.45; t(190) = .02, p = .98), even as their actual choice behavior showed otherwise. 
Overall, the results of this experiment provide support for a dual-process account in 
explaining the observed difference in preference consistency; that is, when the assessment of 
product options involves the consideration of time versus money, it puts one in a processing 
mode that is relatively more affective than analytical. This experiment shows that this differential 
reliance on thinking versus feeling plays a mediational role, accounting (at least in part) for the 
greater preference consistency found with time than with money. Furthermore, the results of this 
experiment continue to rule out a number of alternative accounts (e.g., choice difficulty, 
perceived difference, and attribute informativeness of choice options), while suggesting that 
individuals may not be cognizant of the degree of transitivity in their choices. 
While these results provide initial evidence for the role of feeling versus thinking, further 
evidence of a more affective mode of processing in the case of time versus money would help to 
consolidate the answer to the question of why greater preference consistency occurs with time-
based than with money-based product evaluations. We aim to do this in the next experiment 
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based on the following premise: if greater affective processing does indeed characterize how 
time information is processed compared to money, we ought to be able to detect spillover effects 
of that mode of processing on a subsequent task.  
 
EXPERIMENT 4: RATIO-BIAS PARADIGM 
Overview and Method 
 In this experiment, we used the same general procedure as in our earlier experiments, 
except that immediately following the product choice task, participants engaged in an additional 
task. This new task, based on Kirkpatrick and Epstein’s (1992) ratio-bias paradigm, allowed us 
to test for any carryover effects of an affective mode of processing invoked by the earlier choice 
task. That is, by examining the degree of this carryover effect, we were able to ascertain the 
extent of affective (vs. analytical) processing that accompanied time-based and money-based 
product evaluations.  
 A total of 131 respondents from an online survey company participated in this 
experiment for a small fee. Three respondents indicated in a post-experiment questionnaire that 
they had participated in a similar study before, two respondents indicated that they were color-
blind (and hence effectively preventing them from completing the ratio-bias task), and one 
respondent took an unusually long time (more than three standard deviations above the mean) to 
complete the choice task. These respondents were excluded from the analysis, giving us an 
effective sample size of 125.5 
 We used the same vacation resorts stimuli and manipulation as in experiment 2. As 
before, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions—control, money, and 
                                                 
5 The main pattern of results remained statistically significant at the p = .05 level when these participants were 
included. 
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time—to complete the two-stage binary choice task. After making their choices, in a purportedly 
unrelated study, participants were asked to play a hypothetical game of chance (Kirkpatrick and 
Epstein 1992; Avnet, Pham, and Stephen 2012) in which they had to choose between two bowls 
that contained a mix of red and white jellybeans. One jellybean would then be picked at random 
from the chosen bowl and if a red jellybean is picked, they would earn a $5 reward; picking a 
white jellybean, on the other hand, would not earn them anything. The two bowls of jellybeans 
were designed such that one bowl contained one red jellybean and 11 white jellybeans (small 
bowl), while the other contained six red jellybeans and 80 white jellybeans (large bowl). The 
larger bowl while containing more jellybeans presents a smaller probability of picking a red 
jellybean (about a 7.0% chance) compared to the small bowl (about an 8.3% chance). Epstein 
and others (e.g., Kirpatrick and Epstein 1992; Avnet, Pham, and Stephen 2012) demonstrated in 
studies using this paradigm that individuals who approached the problem with a rational mindset 
or logical reasoning would draw on knowledge of ratios to conclude that the smaller bowl was 
the superior choice, whereas those who allowed their feelings or more experiential processing to 
guide their choices tended to choose the larger bowl instead. Thus, we reason that if participants 
completed the resort choice task by relying more on their feelings, this affective processing mode 
would persist even as they moved on to the jellybean task and would show up as a tendency to 
choose the big bowl over the small one.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Preference consistency. Again replicating the basic effect in the earlier experiments, 
participants in the money condition (M = 3.29, SD = 3.66) committed significantly more 
transitivity violations than participants in the control condition (M = 1.86, SD = 2.83; p = .04) as 
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well as those in the time condition (M = 1.43, SD = 2.44; p < .01); overall ANOVA: F(2, 122) = 
4.49, p = .01. In contrast, participants in the time condition and the control condition did not 
differ in the number of transitivity violations they committed (p = .54). 
 Testing for affective processing: Choice of jellybean bowl. As predicted, participants in 
the money condition were significantly less likely (20.4%) to choose the big bowl of jellybeans 
than both participants in the control condition (47.2%; z = 2.62, p < .01) and those in the time 
condition (40.0%; z = 2.02, p = .04). Thus, participants in the money condition had evidently 
relied more on thinking (logical reasoning) to arrive at their choices, relative to those in the other 
two conditions who relied more on feelings.  
These results, together with those of experiment 3, provide consistent evidence for 
differing processing modes when people evaluate choices that involve money and choices that 
involve time. A greater reliance on feelings in the case of time than of money facilitates 
consistency in preferences. While our argument focuses on this relative difference in processing 
style, these results are interesting because they suggest that, at least in this situation, it is not time 
that increases reliance on feelings but money that shifts people away from using their feelings. 
This finding then begs the following questions: If participants in the money condition 
were situationally induced to rely on feelings when making their decisions, will this help to make 
their preferences more consistent? If the process underlying the difference between the time and 
money conditions is indeed a differential reliance on feeing versus thinking, one would expect 
the answer to the question to be affirmative. Such a finding would further bolster confidence that 
a more affective, less analytical mindset is what drives preference consistency. Relatedly, given 
that there are individual differences in reliance on feeling versus thinking in decision making, 
will those who are dispositionally inclined to rely on feeling be less prone to errors of 
  
30
consistency when making money-based evaluations? Again, finding that someone who naturally 
processes more affectively has more consistent preferences would further support our 
conclusions regarding the role of affect. We addressed these questions in the following two 
experiments. 
 
EXPERIMENTS 5 AND 6: SITUATIONAL AND DISPOSITIONAL RELIANCE ON 
FEELING VERSUS THINKING 
Overview and Method 
 Experiments 5 and 6 further examined the role of feeling versus thinking in the greater 
consistency found for considerations of time versus money. Identical stimuli and similar 
procedures were used in both experiments. The main difference is that experiment 5 examined 
the moderating role of situationally-induced reliance on feeling versus thinking on preference 
consistency, whereas experiment 6 looked at the moderating role of a dispositional tendency to 
rely on feeling or thinking.  
Experiment 5. In this experiment, we used the same set of flight options that was used in 
experiment 1A. We provided half of the participants (i.e., time condition) with flight-duration 
information for the various flight options and the other half (i.e., money condition) with airfare 
information. All participants were also given a short description of the distinction between using 
one’s affective responses or objective evaluations when choosing between products. During the 
choice task, however, half of the participants (feeling condition) were explicitly instructed to 
focus on how they felt towards each product and to ignore how they would objectively evaluate 
the product, whereas the other half (thinking condition) were explicitly instructed to focus on 
how they would objectively evaluate each product and to ignore how they felt about the product. 
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 A total of 222 students from a large university in Asia participated in experiment 5 and 
were asked to imagine that they had to fly between Asia and the U.S. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (Resource type: time vs. money) X 2 
(Decision mode: feeling vs. thinking) between-subjects design. As before, participants had to 
make a total of 36 binary flight choices after studying the various available options. After 
making their choices, they were asked to rate on a seven-point scale (1: very easy; 7: very 
difficult) how difficult it was for them to decide between the options. 
Experiment 6. As an alternative approach to explicitly instructing participants to evaluate 
the options using a particular mode of processing, we measured in experiment 6 their natural 
tendency to rely on their feelings or logical considerations when making product choices. 
A total of 142 students from the same university in Asia participated in this experiment. 
The manipulation of resource type and the set of stimuli used were identical to those in 
experiment 5. However, after participants completed the choice task, they were asked to rate 
their tendency to rely on their feelings versus their logical considerations in everyday decisions 
(1: feelings and emotions; 7: logical considerations). As in all the previous experiments, 
participants were also asked to rate their perceived difficulty of the choice task.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Experiment 5. An analysis of the number of transitivity violations participants committed 
across conditions using a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of resource type 
(F(1, 218) = 5.30, p = .02) and a significant interaction between resource type and decision mode 
(F(1, 218) = 7.31, p < .01). The main effect of decision mode was not significant (F(1, 218) = 
1.13, p = .29; see figure 4).  
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-------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Supporting our predictions, participants in the money condition who were asked to rely 
on feeling when making their evaluations (M = 3.64, SD = 3.68) committed fewer transitivity 
violations than those who were asked to rely on thinking instead (M = 5.74, SD = 4.70; t(110) = 
2.63, p = .01). Interestingly, these participants (in the money-feeling condition) exhibited levels 
of transitivity that were statistically equivalent to those in the time-feeling condition – the group 
that one would expect to be the most transitive (t(110) = .29, p = .77).  
Parallel comparisons for participants in the time condition revealed that those who were 
asked to rely on feeling (M = 3.86, SD = 4.46) did not differ significantly from those who were 
asked to rely on thinking (M = 2.94, SD = 3.62; t(108) = 1.18, p = .24). Those in the time-
thinking condition did, however, differ significantly from those in the money-thinking condition 
– the group expected to be the least transitive (t(108) = 3.47, p < .001). 
Further, we expected participants in the time condition who were instructed to rely on 
their feelings to be more transitive in their choices than participants in the money condition who 
were instructed to rely on logical considerations. Consistent with this expectation, a significant 
difference in preference consistency was found between participants in these two conditions, 
with those in the time-feeling condition (M = 3.86, SD = 4.46) committing fewer transitivity 
violations than those in the money-thinking condition (M = 5.74, SD = 4.70; t(112) = 2.19, p = 
.03). 
In contrast to these transitivity differences, the amount of time participants took to make 
their flight choices did not differ across conditions nor did their perceived difficulty of the choice 
task – neither the main effects of the two independent factors nor the interaction between them 
was significant for the analyses of these measures (all p > .27).  
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 In sum, the results in this experiment support our main hypothesis that a deliberate 
strategy of relying on feeling when making money-based evaluations would improve preference 
consistency. However, the null difference between the time-thinking and time-feeling conditions 
was unexpected. We will discuss this finding more fully in the General Discussion section. 
 Experiment 6. We treated participants’ self-reported decision-mode ratings as a 
continuous measure, and regressed the number of transitivity violations that participants made on 
a dummy variable for resource type (1: money condition, 0: time condition), their self-reported 
decision-mode ratings, and an interaction term for these two factors.  
 The regression results revealed a significant positive two-way interaction between 
resource type and decision mode on the number of transitivity violations (β = .71, t(138) = 2.70, 
p = .008). This significant interaction indicates that the greater transitivity violations committed 
in the money condition relative to the time condition occurred for participants who relied more 
on logical considerations than on feelings; this effect was eliminated, however, for those who 
relied more on their feelings than on logical considerations. To explicitly test the nature of this 
interaction, spotlight analysis at one standard deviation above the mean of participants’ decision-
mode scores showed a significant difference (β = .46, t(138) = 4.05, p < .001), indicating that 
participants who tended to rely more on logical considerations during decision-making made 
significantly more transitivity violations in the money condition than in the time condition. In 
contrast, a similar spotlight analysis at one standard deviation below the mean of participants’ 
decision-mode scores did not reveal any significant difference (β = .02, t(138) = .21, p = .83), 
indicating that for participants who tended to rely more on their feelings during decision making, 
these was no difference in preference consistency between the money condition and the time 
condition. See figure 5 for a pictorial depiction of this interaction effect. 
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-------------------------------- 
Insert figure 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 The interaction between resource type and decision mode did not significantly predict 
decision time (p = .44) or perceived decision difficulty (p = .93). Neither the main effect of 
resource type nor the main effect of decision mode was significant for both dependent measures. 
Again, these results are consistent with the patterns observed in experiment 5.  
 Overall, the results of experiments 5 and 6 provide convergent evidence for the role of 
affect in preference consistency. Specifically, we find that while money-based evaluations tend 
to be less consistent compared to time-based evaluations (as demonstrated in the previous 
experiments), adopting a deliberate strategy of relying on feeling when making evaluations helps 
to improve consistency. Similarly, those who have a dispositional tendency to rely on feeling 
rather than thinking when making evaluations are more consistent in their money-based 
evaluations relative to those whose natural inclination is to rely on logical considerations. Hence, 
a reliance on affect when making evaluations that involve a consideration of money, whether 
situationally induced or a natural disposition, has a positive effect on preference consistency.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Consumers make a variety of decisions in their everyday lives that involve temporal 
and/or monetary considerations. Past research, however, has demonstrated that the psychological 
effects of focusing on these two economic resources may be distinct, leading to different 
behavioral consequences. In the present work, we build upon and add to this growing literature 
by examining whether (and why) focusing on time versus money might generate different 
degrees of consistency in consumer preferences. 
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 Across a series of seven experiments, whether it is choosing between flights (experiments 
1A, 3, 5, and 6), software (experiment 1B), or vacations (experiments 2 and 4), and despite prior 
research that has demonstrated greater ambiguity in temporal (vs. monetary) valuation, 
participants exhibited greater consistency in their preferences when considering a time-related 
attribute (e.g., flight duration) than a money-related attribute (e.g., airfare). That this basic effect 
was obtained using three different approaches to invoke time or money consideration further 
underscores its robustness (meta-analytic comparisons across all experiments: d = .38, z = 5.66, p 
< .001; homogeneity analysis: Q = 1.39, p = .97).  
We posit that this effect arises because whereas thinking about time is inherently more 
affective, monetary considerations tend to be relatively more analytical. This makes money-
based product evaluations more prone to cognitive noise, engendering greater preference 
inconsistency (Lee, Amir, and Ariely 2009). Supporting this account, not only did we find that 
preference consistency is mediated by the degree to which individuals rely on their feelings 
versus logical considerations when making product decisions (experiment 3), we also showed 
that the greater analytical (vs. affective) processing that accompanies monetary consideration has 
a carryover effect that influences people’s subsequent behavior in unrelated tasks (experiment 4). 
Moreover, deliberate reliance on feelings when evaluating products based on a monetary 
factor—be it situationally induced (experiment 5) or a dispositional inclination (experiment 6)—
improves preference consistency. Our findings also show that alternative explanations based on 
differential decision difficulty or differential decision weights across conditions cannot fully 
account for the basic effect. 
Our discussion thus far has focused on the difference between time and money, reflecting 
the main thrust of our current work. However, results from the experiments where we also 
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included a control condition (experiments 1a, 1b, 2, and 4) revealed comparable degrees of 
preference consistency between the time and control conditions. It may hence be tempting to 
conclude based on this finding that the type of processing that occurs when time is considered is 
no different than under ordinary circumstances. However, we caution against such a conclusion 
given that participants in the control condition considered one attribute fewer than those in the 
time condition when making their choices and the task was decidedly an easier one. (Recall also 
that the time taken to complete the choice task was shorter in the control condition compared to 
the time condition.) Thus, the fact that participants in the time condition committed an equivalent 
number of intransitivity errors, despite having a more difficult choice task, suggests that there are 
real contributions of affective processing to preference consistency. Thus, in this work, we 
cannot draw definite conclusions about which particular processing mode individuals adopt 
when neither resource is salient; rather, what we can conclude is that temporal considerations 
lead to more affective and less analytical processing than monetary considerations, which in turn 
generate different degrees of preference consistency. 
Our main interest is in preference consistency as manifested in repeated choices in a 
given product category, and we acknowledge that this setting might not have allowed ambiguity 
in time valuation to exert an effect in full measure. Thus, despite the robustness of our main 
preference consistency finding as demonstrated across different product categories, different 
approaches to manipulate resource focus, and different measures of preference stability, 
alternative settings other than the one we used may allow ambiguity to play a more prominent 
role, potentially augmenting or counteracting the effect of affective processing on preference 
consistency (see introduction for a discussion of how ambiguity might impact preference 
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consistency). Therefore, context variability is a potential moderating factor that can be explored 
in future research. 
 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Overall, our preference-consistency findings highlight an important decisional 
consequence of focusing on time versus money in making product choices, further eroding the 
validity of the common adage: “time is money.” More fundamentally, through the investigation 
of these behavioral consequences in consumer preferences, our results also illuminate and 
validate an underlying property that recent time-money (Liu and Aaker 2008; Mogilner and 
Aaker 2009) research has suggested: temporal considerations invoke greater affective processing 
than monetary considerations. Our current empirical findings directly demonstrate this property. 
To the extent that affective processing and analytical processing can lead to different behavioral 
consequences, whether in terms of people’s economic behavior (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2004; Loewenstein et al. 2001), their ability to exercise self-
control (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999), their perceived psychological distance to both positive and 
negative events in their lives (Van Boven et al. 2010), their loyalty toward brands (Chaudhuri 
and Holbrook 2001; Oliver 1993), and even their assessments of life satisfaction and overall 
well-being (Schwarz and Clore 1983), the potential for significantly different behavioral 
consequences when one focuses on time versus money, mediated by different degrees of 
affective and analytical processing, seems widely applicable.  
 From a more practical perspective, given that an assumption of preference consistency 
underlies many marketing programs and activities—from marketing research to product 
development, and from marketing promotion to customer relationship management—the 
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improved understanding of how temporal versus monetary evaluations can impact consumers’ 
preference consistency can help marketers implement more effective strategies to predict and 
influence consumer buying and consumption. For example, a company that markets vacation 
packages might offer recommendations to customers for their next purchase based on their 
previous choices, and an understanding of whether a focus on time or money is a better predictor 
of preference can improve their success at making the right recommendations. Consumers’ own 
welfare can also be better served if they are aware of the differential impact that focusing on time 
versus money can have on how they process product information, and in turn, the stability of 
their evaluations and decisions. 
 
‘Feeling Money’ versus ‘Thinking about Time’ 
 While the results of experiments 5 and 6 support an affect-based account for the 
preference consistency finding such that a deliberate reliance on feeling (vs. thinking) when 
considering a monetary factor improves preference consistency, the results also suggest that a 
deliberate reliance on thinking (vs. feeling) when considering a temporal factor did not produce 
the mirror effect of degrading preference consistency. This latter result suggests that the affective 
processing induced by temporal considerations might have taken precedence over any deliberate 
attempt to process the product options based on logical evaluations. Although this result might 
seem an anomaly at first glance, a body of work on the role of affect in decision-making suggests 
that affective processing can often play a dominant role over analytical processing in affecting 
the decisions people make (see Cohen, Pham and Andrade 2008 and Greifeneder, Bless, and 
Pham 2011 for recent reviews)—affect, compared to cognition, has been shown to have primacy 
in terms of being the ‘default’ decision mode that people rely on (Pham et al. 2001; Siemer and 
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Reisenzeim 1998), to contribute toward a higher level of product satisfaction and brand loyalty 
(Oliver 1993), to have greater influence on people’s attitudes and behavioral intentions in a 
variety of domains (e.g., financial investments, blood donations, presidential voting, sexual 
abstinence) especially when affective and cognitive inputs have opposite valence (Allen, 
Machleit, and Kleine 1992; Bodur, Brinberg, and Coupey 2000; Lavine et al. 1998; MacGregor 
et al. 2000), and to generate attitudes that are held with greater confidence (Edwards and von 
Hippel 1995; Epstein and Pacini 1999). So while we cannot rule out the possibility that this lack 
of an impact on preference consistency in the case of time is a function of the specific 
experimental paradigm we used, a more in-depth examination of the specific conditions under 
which affect dominates cognition in influencing judgments and decisions is no doubt a 
worthwhile topic for continued research. 
 
Usage of Time versus Money 
 An important distinction sets time and money apart as economic resources: while an 
expenditure of money—whether in the service of acquiring goods and services or as a donation 
to a cause—is almost always regarded as a cost, an expenditure of time, on the other hand, can 
be construed in both positive and negative ways. Specifically, whereas spending time on 
activities such as commuting, installing software, or waiting in line to get a table at a popular 
restaurant is generally treated as a cost, spending time listening to music or vacationing at a 
resort is experiential and connotes pleasure and enjoyment. Mogilner and Aaker (2009) alluded 
to this difference, but found that both operationalizations of time as a cost (fixing a laptop) and 
as an experience (listening to music on an iPod) led to similar findings of personal connection 
with a product when one is prompted to think about time. Similarly, the experiments reported in 
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the present work operationalized time in multiple ways (as flight duration vs. length of vacation) 
but the basic preference consistency finding did not vary across these different 
operationalizations. These results thus suggest that whether time spent has positive or negative 
associations does not play a critical role in engendering consistent preferences. Rather, we posit 
that it is the mere consideration of time versus money that spontaneously invokes a processing 
mode that differs between these two resources. More research, however, is needed before a 
conclusive claim can be made. 
 
The Upside of Focusing on Time versus Money 
In the present work, we account for the observed preference consistency difference 
between time-based and money-based product evaluations by demonstrating the greater affective 
versus analytical processing associated with the former compared to the latter. Recent work has 
further pointed to the possibility that thinking about time might lead individuals to more 
effectively pursue personal happiness in their lives, for instance, by making them more likely to 
choose experiential purchases over material purchases, or to allocate more time in their daily 
lives to social interactions than to their professional occupations (Mogilner 2010). To the extent 
that preference consistency is beneficial and considered a benchmark of decision quality (Bem 
1972; Tversky 1969), our results suggest another potential upside of focusing on the value of 
time than of money. Future research can further explore other potential benefits of thinking about 
time (e.g., consumption satisfaction), as well as conditions under which focusing on one resource 
versus the other when making choices would generate greater psychological well-being. 
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FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF TRANSITIVITY VIOLATIONS (EXPERIMENT 1A) 
 
 
Note.—Error bars denote standard errors. 
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FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF DECISION TIME (EXPERIMENT 1A) 
 
 
Note.—Error bars denote standard errors. 
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FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTS IN VACATION 
DECISIONS (EXPERIMENT 2) 
 
   
Note.—Error bars denote standard errors, and * indicates significant difference across conditions 
(p < .001). The focal bars refer to duration in the time condition and price in the money 
condition.  
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FIGURE 4: COMPARISON OF TRANSITIVITY VIOLATIONS (EXPERIMENT 5) 
 
 
Note.—Error bars denote standard errors. 
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FIGURE 5: COMPARISON OF TRANSITIVITY VIOLATIONS (EXPERIMENT 6) 
 
 
Note.—Error bars denote standard errors. The graph indicates that among participants who 
naturally relied on their feelings and emotions in decision making (ratings ≤ 4), they exhibited a 
similar degree of preference consistency whether they focused on time or money in product 
choice. In contrast, among participants who naturally relied on their logical considerations 
(ratings > 4), those who focused on money in product choice committed more transitivity 
violations than those who focused on time. 
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